Through governance of natural hazards and disasters, states play a central role in keeping people safe and in helping them recover economically in the event of catastrophe. In doing so, they establish a kind of social contract, determining what will be collectively managed and what will be individually borne. How that balance is struck depends, in part, on the relative strength of moral claims for solidarity from fellow citizens and taxpayers. In this article, I examine the renegotiation of that social contract through the lens of contested efforts to reform the US National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) from 2011 to 2014. In the face of massive debt the program incurred after Hurricane Katrina, reformers easily won a technocratic fix that would enhance individual responsibility, premised on moral claims about deservingness and individual choice. However, less than two years later, following Hurricane Sandy and backlash from affected policyholders, Congress abandoned some of the changes with new legislation that committed to incorporating need-based considerations to the NFIP for the first time. Drawing on archival, interview, and ethnographic data, I trace the morally charged debate. I argue that the result defined "deservingness" around ability to pay for risk exposure, qualifying an individualization of responsibility for addressing the problem of flood loss-a problem that might instead demand broader risk sharing, particularly as climate change worsens the threat of flooding.
In the sections that follow, I begin by situating the case in a theoretical tradition in welfare state scholarship that typically excludes this policy domain-natural hazards and disasters-from its view. As in social policy debates more generally, NFIP stakeholders articulated and disputed claims about deservingness and choice to justify rival visions of the fair terms of social interdependence in flood insurance. After describing the methodology and evidence, I turn to the history of the NFIP. I show how its design and implementation created space for these rival visions through the incorporation of individualistic and solidaristic elements in the program. I then tell the story of NFIP reform in three acts, following the advocacy that led to reform, the backlash to reform, and the "reform of the reform" that was ultimately passed. In the discussion, I analyze how the emergent definition of deservingness reorganized the arrangement of federal assistance and individual responsibility, forging a tentative resolution to the competing demands made on the NFIP. I conclude with the implications of these changes, and the arguments that produced them, for the question of how states and citizens adapt to a future defined by climate change.
The Moral Economy of American Natural Hazards and Disaster Policy
Political sociologists and political scientists have connected the scope and generosity of social policy to the articulation and mobilization of "categories of worth," particularly whether policymakers and the public perceive recipients as "deserving" or "undeserving."
Such distinctions serve discursively to justify the balance of individual and collective obligations and to institutionalize programmatic boundaries between categories of beneficiaries. 1 In the United States, this normative distinction has been especially powerful. 2 The deserving are generally believed not to be to blame for the adversity they face, whereas the undeserving are often narrated in policy debates as those who have made poor choices; they are in some way personally responsible for their own troubles. Claims of deservingness thus implicate judgments about the existence and meaningfulness of individual choice. This implication has been apparent in the last several decades of American social policymaking, where "deservingness" has not always been explicitly invoked by political elites. 3 Instead, arguments for cutting back on spending, adding requirements, or reducing eligibility have been premised on ideas about choice, not only as a way of attributing blame (i.e., past choices create present suffering), but also as a strategy of governing. Policymakers seek to manage the choices of beneficiaries, scrutinizing the "perverse incentives" that disincline the target population from taking personal responsibility and that keep them dependent. These arguments and strategies address the welfare state's "moral hazard" problem: that rational individuals will, if protected from the consequences of their actions by social insurance or other policies, make irresponsible choices to their own detriment and that of the collective.
According to this particular logic about how policies affect behavior, it is more efficient, fair, and even more compassionate to foster self-reliance and personal responsibility-and to limit collective obligations on that basis. 4 This article examines contestation surrounding deservingness and choice in natural hazards and disaster policy, a domain in which questions of moral economy warrant greater attention. Though not conventionally considered to fall under the umbrella of American social protection (and neglected in welfare state scholarship for that reason), natural hazards and disaster policy commits federal expenditures to respond to those in need. Policymakers may not design such policy as a form of antipoverty welfare, but it nevertheless shares risk and compensates individuals for loss and suffering. 5 Framed this way, extending an analysis of moral claims about deservingness and choice to this policy domain can help explain designations of how much, or what kinds of, responsibility individuals and local communities are expected to assume to protect themselves.
As in the context of social policy, money is the driver of contests over the designation of deservingness and the meaning of choice in natural hazards and disaster policy. In the United States, the ability to represent loss after a catastrophe as blameless enhances claims for federal resources. 6 Blamelessness, in turn, has historically corresponded to the treatment of natural disasters as "acts of God," whether literally or figuratively understood: unfortunate events that can be neither foreseen nor prevented. 7 Those afflicted by them are thus blameless victims, facing misfortune that might befall anyone, even those who had made the "right" 
Methodological Approach and Evidence
Insurance is, by its nature, a mechanism for socializing risk. However, it can do that to a greater or lesser extent. 10 The technical characteristics of programs and policies include and exclude, forge communities of fate, and assign obligations to members. 11 In this article, I and news media accounts of the flood insurance reform process. By combining fieldwork with information and accounts in relevant documents, I strove for an abundance of data about how these reforms unfolded.
The overall approach provides a "policy-focused" analysis that treats policy as a terrain of struggle as well as the prize of political action. In outlining this approach, Hacker and Pierson observe that the stuff of modern politics is often about "reshaping governance in enduring ways" via public policy changes, rather than gaining office. This shifts our analytical gaze from elections to those policies. 13 Applied to this case, flood insurance policy provides both the terrain for competing claims about the efficient and fair terms of social interdependence and the prize that various interests and groups pursued through the promulgation of moral claims.
The History of the NFIP
To contextualize the post-Katrina financial crisis facing the NFIP and the debate that ensued, we need to examine how the terms of social interdependence in the face of flood risk were initially established and how they broke down. In the history of the NFIP's origins and implementation, these terms have been connected to the set of public policy objectives that policymakers hoped to achieve with a public flood insurance program. In practice, they yielded a flood insurance program that encompassed elements of both a more individualistic private insurance program and a more solidaristic social insurance program. When the program appeared in need of major reform, stakeholders prioritized these elements differently, mobilizing claims about deservingness and choice to make competing demands on the program.
Congress established the NFIP in 1968 as a new mechanism for managing and distributing the rising costs of flood losses. Federal flood risk management had previously combined structural flood protection (e.g., the funding of walls, dams, levees) and subsidized loans or disaster relief following catastrophe-a combination that was a growing and unpredictable drain on public resources by the 1950s. Structural flood protection had made flood-prone areas appear unduly safe for development and habitation, encouraging more people to move in and putting more property at risk of loss when structures failed (a dynamic referred to as the "levee effect"). 14 According to a 1966 study commissioned by Congress from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), public flood insurance, premised on scientific developments that made catastrophic risk assessment possible, would achieve several public policy goals simultaneously. First, it would stem growing relief costs by having people prefund at least a portion of their own recovery through the payment of premiums, decreasing burdens on taxpayers. Second, actuarial premiums, that is, rates based on assessments of flood risk, would create "much stronger" price incentives that individuals would incorporate into rational decisions about whether to buy or build in a flood zone. 15 Individual policyholders, rather than the federal government, would thus bear personal responsibility for managing the costs of living in the floodplain. In doing so, they would enhance collective flood security through their own individual calculations, which would presumably lead them away from the riskiest and most uneconomical uses of the floodplain.
Under an actuarial system, the problem of flood, transformed into risk, could now be governed through the calculating actions of individuals on behalf of themselves and their families. 16 The outlines of the NFIP codified expectations regarding individual choice, dependent on the availability of scientific risk assessment that would produce both information and incentives. 
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With the establishment of such a program, the federal government would in a single act transform flood from uninsurable to insurable risk, protecting property owners by spreading flood risks nationwide and providing more reliable compensation. 18 For people already living in flood-prone areas, who had lacked risk information on which to make an informed and economical choice, actuarial rates could be unaffordable. In congressional debates to authorize the NFIP, policymakers insisted that premiums needed to be "reasonable," as a matter of fairness. 19 They did not want to penalize homeowners for choices made before floodplains were mapped. The NFIP thus put in place subsidies that would allow such floodplain occupants to access protection at lower, "reasonable," rates. 20 Members of Congress also expressed a desire for rates to be reasonable more generally to encourage all property owners with federally backed mortgages in high-risk flood zones (areas determined to be subject to flooding by the 1-percent-annual-chance flood event or the "100-year floodplain"). 22 The program also put in place a grandfathering provision that allowed homeowners to hold onto previous (lower) rates if, when risk maps were updated (as they were mandated to be for the sake of accuracy), they were shown to be at greater risk. With subsidies and grandfathering in place, in practice Congress and the NFIP did not commit to implementing fully the actuarial calculus of choice, targeting instead an objective of broader risk sharing through "reasonable," that is, affordable, rates. The NFIP emulated a more individualistic private insurance institution in classifying risk and assigning individual contributions on that basis. In decoupling some premium levels from risk, providing guaranteed coverage (such that no flood risk is too bad to insure, even for properties that repeatedly flood), and, after 1973, mandating coverage, the NFIP resembled a more solidaristic social insurance program. From its early years, the NFIP was meant to be both actuarial and affordable, risk-based and broadly accessible: objectives that were not necessarily compatible and that created space for competing demands when the program reached a crisis point.
Even 
NFIP Reform in Three Acts
The reform at the heart of the controversy examined here, the Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act (henceforth "Biggert-Waters"), became law in July 2012 with overwhelming bipartisan support from an otherwise highly polarized Congress. BiggertWaters was the most comprehensive reform of the NFIP since its establishment, intended to make the program "actuarially sound," namely, to restructure the program to bring in enough in premiums to cover the risk. The key provisions of Biggert-Waters (a) eliminated premium discounts (from subsidies and grandfathering) and imposed new actuarial rates, programwide, that reflected the individual's "true cost" of risk coverage, and (b) recommitted resources to fund flood risk studies and maps for the sake of providing up-to-date and accurate scientific risk assessments and risk-based insurance rates. The legislation also toughened the penalties on lenders who fail to enforce the mandatory insurance purchase requirement; mandated that FEMA study the effectiveness of building codes and made grants available for building code enforcement; and mandated that FEMA study the affordability of actuarial rates-but did not indicate that this study should come before FEMA increased rates as it implemented the rest of the law.
In the sections that follow, I tell the story of Biggert-Waters and the backlash that The American taxpayer is increasingly unwilling to provide financial support for those who have time and time again received handouts post-flood who then do absolutely nothing to prevent future damages as they know Uncle Sam will be there check in hand to quite literally bail them out again. 42 Neither were taxpayers willing to support irresponsible NFIP policyholders: "Gone, too, are the days that the taxpayer will support those who knowingly choose to live in areas and in homes with severe flood risk." In the same Senate hearing, a representative from the Heartland Institute (a libertarian think tank) submitted a statement urging that "The federal government should not encourage the choice to live in harm's way" through below-risk insurance rating and outdated flood risk assessments and maps. 43 Experts at these hearings were asked to address how an actuarial shift would affect low-and middle-income policyholders. They suggested voucher programs, like those administered by HUD for housing, or separate appropriations for supplementing insurance payments.
Taken together, these reformers sought to motivate policy change by emphasizing the knowability of flood risk, which carried with it obligations surrounding individual choice and what flood zone policyholders thus deserved vis-à-vis taxpayers. Floods were not calamities that hit people unaware; they had long been scientifically assessed risks, visualized on maps.
The availability of risk information made flood risk choice-sensitive: policyholders put themselves at risk when they chose to buy or build in the flood zones and were therefore not blameless in the event of a loss. The assignment of risk-based cost at the individual level worked against a sense of shared vulnerability, bolstering the argument that taxpayers who had made the choice not to expose themselves to flood risk ought not be made to pay for the risks of others. A reformed NFIP would not only enhance fairness based on prior choices, but also enact a more sensible risk-based calculus of choice going forward-one that had long been promised, but not delivered because of subsidization and grandfathering. The prudent future role of the NFIP was not to provide support in the form of subsidized insurance; that was feeding an ongoing moral hazard that invited development in the floodplains. Rather, echoing arguments in other arenas of policymaking, individuals needed informationvisualized on maps and transformed into a price signal-that would allow them to make the best choices. Reform needed to involve some restructuring of the incentives of the insured, with the individual taking more responsibility for exposure to and for managing his/her risk.
The Biggert-Waters bill won bipartisan enthusiasm, passed both houses of Congress, and was signed by the president. Under the law, subsidized policyholders would see a 25
percent increase each year until premiums reflected the "full risk" rate. The end of grandfathering would affect all policyholders when their maps were updated. Properties that had been intentionally built outside the flood zones could find themselves "mapped in" and subject to flood insurance purchase requirements for the first time-at actuarial rates. Or, if new maps showed that a property was now at higher risk, the policyholder would not be able to retain his or her earlier (lower) rate. FEMA began implementing the law without completing the affordability study.
Act II: Backlash to Biggert-Waters: Disputed Choice and Deservingness
Just three months after Biggert-Waters was signed into law, its implementation was tested:
Hurricane Sandy devastated coastal New York and New Jersey (the storm also added another individual property could not be assessed scientifically. Rather, it argued that FEMA was bad at producing and communicating those scientific assessments; as a result, many homeowners did not and could not know their "true" flood risk, nor could actuarial premiums be established on a scientific basis. In the first place, many of the maps were long outdated and therefore inaccurate visualizations of current risk. Mapping flood risk takes considerable time and resources, which FEMA and the NFIP have had difficulty sustaining. 46 For any given community, the many years that pass between reassessments compromise the basis of sensible zoning. When Sandy hit, most of the data underlying New York City's maps, for instance, were from 1983.
Stop FEMA Now urged homeowners to fight new maps on the grounds that they "overestimated" risk whenever possible. Even if maps were up to date, their scientific and technical accuracy could be contested, through FEMA's formal appeals process, on the basis of competing and justifiable assumptions, data, and models. Stop FEMA Now argued that homeowners would take responsibility for their individual risk but, because of the weaknesses in mapping, they could not trust that the risk was itself legitimately established.
In the words of Queens, New York City activist with Stop FEMA Now:
We're not trying to say we shouldn't look at risk, and we're trying to dodge things here, but we want it to be accurate. And if you're going to tell someone you're going to lose a huge value on your house based on Biggert-Waters and maybe somebody won't invest here, or maybe you got to raise your house for 100,000 dollars, we said to them, we don't want it 99 percent correct. What you're already telling us is, it's not even 80 percent correct. We want 100 percent correct. 47 Stop FEMA Now also claimed that the NFIP had not communicated to subsidized policyholders that their rates did not in fact reflect their risk. Indeed, in the case of most subsidized properties, the "true risk" rate could not be estimated on the available data; FEMA did not have complete records of property elevations that would make such estimates possible. 48 The other thing is, we've been in the communities. . . . There was a compact, a promise somewhat; they encouraged coastal development. And I bought my house with flood insurance, and other people built the community with a subsidized program in place. It's changing the game a little late for a lot of people.
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To the extent that homeowners in the coastal areas of New York's boroughs had chosen to live in high-risk areas, their choice was facilitated not only by flood insurance implementation problems, but also by the interests of powerful actors, inside and outside government, who encouraged real estate development (some of whom were now political allies of Stop FEMA Now). In the words of the president of the Broad Channel (Queens)
Civic Association and a New York organizer with Stop FEMA Now:
The government made a program, it was the stated policy of the United States government from '68 on, is that [flood insurance] will be available, and it will be affordable. It wasn't because oh, we want to help these people out. Maybe part of it is. It was because of the fact that all of these neighborhoods around here, back then, were looking, 'Do we build around here?' And of course the government's always been building and creating these areas! And it's been a huge tax return for the government in general, and for the American people. 51 In effect, these homeowners agreed with SmarterSafer and other supporters of BiggertWaters on this point, as well: the federal government had allowed or even encouraged habitation in areas that should perhaps never have been developed. As described above, FEMA had not ensured that local communities were complying with the land use requirements that were supposed to be a condition of accessing the NFIP, despite early and consistent warnings from the GAO and other experts. 52 Communities were getting protection-and individuals were getting subsidies and grandfathered rates-but local officials were not actually restricting or regulating development in the flood zones and were thus putting more people and property at risk. In fact, over time, the federal government Biggert-Waters, the reformers-particularly environmentalists and scientists-continued to stress the importance of risk-based rating for the purposes of planning and individual decision making in the context of climate change. 54 Though they acknowledged the existence of mapping errors, the general picture painted by the science was unambiguous; these were tough but nevertheless urgent and necessary changes, meant to make individuals more resilient.
Defenders of Biggert-Waters confronted the "deservingness" of homeowners by turning to arguments about whom the shift to actuarial rating would really affect. There were "truly needy" policyholders, as experts had testified in congressional hearings, but in the wake of the backlash they called any retreat on NFIP reform a "beach house bailout."
Taxpayers were being asked to continue to support the owners of vacation homes and luxury condominiums. The president and chief economist of the Insurance Information Institute (III)
argued that below-risk premiums were subsidizing millionaires:
I mean, it was subsidizing vacation homeowners, businesses, properties that have been repeatedly flooded. Is this a good use of taxpayer money in this time of austerity? Probably not. Does it make sense at all for people to be subsidizing for people to live on the beach? My answer to that is no. And I think, unless you're one of the people who's receiving that subsidy, the answer is generally no. . . . Why on earth should the federal government be providing subsidized coverage to millionaires to have a beach house? There's no rationale for that. 55 The notion of the beach house bailout also steered the argument for reform out of the potential trap of entrenched sympathy for and solidarity with disaster victims. BiggertWaters' implementation had coincided with Hurricane Sandy. In the national media, the optics of the backlash to Biggert-Waters centered on how its changes were affecting areas devastated by the storm, where Stop FEMA Now had its origins. Stories in the press showed families, standing in the wreckage of their homes, describing how even if they could rebuild, they might not be able to afford to insure and thus faced displacement. These were sympathetic figures: not only had they just suffered catastrophic loss, only to face a new source of financial strain, but they tended to be white and working-or middle-class families.
A slow and complex process for settling claims after Sandy also made the NFIP appear insufficiently responsive to the plight of those who had paid in, attracting the ire of members of Congress.
Defenders of Biggert-Waters argued that, despite the optics, these homeowners were not representative of who was really going to be affected by the changes to the NFIP. The NFIP needed reform because the majority of the people who were benefiting from a subsidized system could afford not to be subsidized. They did not deserve the sympathy of the public, or the support of taxpayers, because they could and should take responsibility for living on the water. One of the founders of the SmarterSafer coalition, a leader of a libertarian think tank, distinguished those who deserved sympathy from those who did not:
First, the places that have been hit the hardest so far [by Biggert-Waters] are nonprimary residences-second homes-and severe repetitive loss properties that taxpayers have already rebuilt. The affordability issue? I don't care, and I don't think anybody else should, either. Nobody's entitled to a second home, and almost nobody is entitled to have the taxpayers rebuild their house more than once. . . . In the case of severe repetitive loss properties, there are a handful of people who are maybe old or long-term incumbent homeowners, who you do have to feel sorry for. . . . Yes, there may well be pain to them. But I don't understand how or why there's a public responsibility to subsidize somebody to live in a particular house in a particular place. There's some public responsibility to house people. People like to live near water. The houses facing the highest rates are the houses right near water, which are expensive. To me, there is an affordability issue, but it's actually reasonably small. mostly single family homes. Most of our residents have family ties to our community, having grown up there and later purchased their first homes there. The homes are modest but they are our homes. Homes that would become unaffordable if the flood insurance rates are allowed to skyrocket. Homes that would become virtually unsellable if the buyer is required to carry an outrageously high flood insurance premium. 58 In an open letter to Congress posted to Stop FEMA Now's website in February 2014, a
Rockaway organizer, a retired firefighter himself, wrote:
Although some groups lead you to believe that all flood policyholders and people who live by the water are multimillionaires, nothing could be further from the truth. In reality we are police officers, firemen, teachers, nurses, sanitation men, and soldiers, also senior citizens and retirees greatly devastated by ruinous flood premiums. We are also families who must live by the water for our livelihood: fishermen, oil workers, engineers, sailors, etc. We are people who have survived for years living in areas that have never been flooded. Now a manmade disaster-the Biggert-Waters Act-will destroy our neighborhoods, causing the unthinkable prospect that we will lose our homes. 59 The "man-made disaster" of Biggert-Waters would push out workers and families on the basis of risk assessments and insurance prices. NFIP policyholders deserved support and solidarity because actuarial rates would have unequal and economically catastrophic effects for the many policyholders who could not afford them.
In truth, property owners of highly varied resources were affected by Biggert-Waters.
Luxury condominium developments and vacation homeowners have benefited from subsidized flood insurance, along with working-class communities. 60 In the wake of BiggertWaters and Sandy, opposing sides of the reform issue staked a position as to whether NFIP policyholders deserved redress by foregrounding one group or the other. What emerged discursively from the contestation between the two was a notion of deservingness as determined around an axis of ability to pay for risk exposure-ability to take responsibility on the basis of risk and its price. Those who deserved sympathy and support were those who truly could not financially support their exposure to risk.
Act III: Reforming the Reform
In Homeowners would return to paying the rate they had been quoted at the time they purchased the policy-when they made a choice on the best or only information available to them at the time.
Congress also addressed the issue of deservingness as it had been framed in the backlash to Biggert-Waters. The two sides had disputed whether at-risk homeowners deserved sympathy, the key contention being whether or not these homeowners could actually afford to pay actuarial insurance premiums: were they beach house millionaires or ordinary folks? With its new legislation, explicitly an "affordability act," Congress indicated that the NFIP first needed to identify and institutionalize methods for telling the difference, and to define criteria for treating the two groups differently in order to avoid unduly harming homeowners when rates increased. The HFIAA did not repeal Biggert-Waters, but it did delay the most dramatic premium increases while FEMA completes its affordability study and produces a "framework." Now, although homeowners could return to below-risk rates, they could expect their premiums to increase by as much as 18 percent every year, moving toward actuarial rates. The HFIAA makes it clear that any assistance should be offered in consideration of a policyholder's income or wealth, providing "targeted assistance to flood insurance policyholders based on their financial ability to continue to participate in the National Flood Insurance Program." 62 The next year, in March and December 2015, the study committee, convened by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and comprising social scientists, flood experts, and statisticians, released two reports to guide the design of an affordability framework. The fundamental question it had to answer was how the federal government might assess the affordability of premiums and policyholders' ability to pay. As the committee pointed out, introducing an affordability framework would require the NFIP to collect and use new kinds of data on its policyholders: their income, wealth, and housing costs. 63 In addition, the committee noted, introducing means testing to the NFIP for the first time would require further political decisions regarding eligibility: Who counts as "truly needy" of continued federal support in order to afford flood insurance? Whereas these kinds of distinctions are common in housing and public assistance, they represent a significant change in the particular context of natural hazards and disaster policy, where means tests and need-based considerations are not so familiar. After natural disasters, for instance, federal relief is damage-based, not income-based. 64 In their first report, the NAS committee looks to other federal agencies and programs that use means tests, including HUD's housing vouchers, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, Medicaid, and the Children's Health Insurance
Program for potential methods of distinguishing eligibility and determining attendant support. 65 Following the release of the NAS reports, a February 2016 GAO study determined that depending on the eligibility threshold used, 47-74 percent of subsidized policyholders would likely be eligible to receive some form of assistance.
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Discussion
The effort to reform the NFIP, to address its massive deficit and restore its fiscal stability, choices on that basis. 67 Stop FEMA Now's achievement, in the end, was to blunt the negative distributional effects of this individualization, through the commitment to provide assistance to those who cannot afford to be fully accountable for the risks they bring to the pool. This outcome protected those homeowners for whom the income shocks could be catastrophic and placated the protesters for the time being.
Fundamentally, the core presumptions are that individuals are the source of risk and that greater individual responsibility on the part of those facing high risk, expressed as a form of market-based financial decision making, will most effectively manage our relationship to catastrophe. The faith in individual incentives remains, despite the evidence that a combination of factors has prevented them from working very well in practice, not least of which is policymakers' aversion to acting on that faith. The legislation does toughen penalties on mortgage lenders who fail to enforce the mandatory purchase requirement and provides resources to strengthen enforcement of land use regulations and building codes.
These measures address important implementation failures, but it remains to be seen whether they can withstand the enduring pressure for local growth and development that have compromised such efforts in the past. Higher prices of insurance may well encourage-or force-some residents to relocate out of harm's way, potentially taking huge losses on their most important assets, but the affluent may never be "priced out" of risky areas and more may even move in. As flood risks spread and worsen-as FEMA itself expects they will under further conditions of climate change-insuring them will require more and more of household budgets, with households having to find ways to manage the pressure on their
finances. This will unfold in a broader context of risk shifts that have left American families providing more and more for their own security. 68 For the time being, the program remains in debt, bringing in total premiums that will likely be insufficient to cover the next catastrophic flood event. 69 The affluent among subsidized NFIP policyholders may indeed be able to afford fullrisk costs and have been benefiting from a policy that, like many others of the American welfare state, inequitably, and often invisibly, enhances the position of the relatively well-off.
Homeowners are a powerful political constituency and mobilize to defend their privileges when threatened. 70 Stop FEMA Now's priority was to fight off income shocks and threats to their property values, a set of immediate but rather limited interests that aligned them with some of the very actors who had helped put them at risk. Stop FEMA Now was not putting forth a vision of broad collective responsibility that would have, perhaps, led it to make common cause instead with renters and poor people who suffer worse from floods. After Sandy, public housing residents in the outer boroughs of New York City-neighbors of the activists in Stop FEMA Now-went without power or heat for weeks and, over four years later, over a dozen public housing sites are still using temporary boilers. 71 Renters affected by Sandy, more likely to be poor and people of color, reported increased rents, displacement from their pre-Sandy homes, overcrowding, and dangerous and unsanitary housing conditions. 72 Flood insurance is itself a policy that helps only those who have something to lose, and these populations struggle to recover without the benefit of natural hazard and disaster policies that target homeowners. Yet in mounting their own reactive set of claims about choice and deservingness, the Stop FEMA Now homeowners laid open some of the public policy contradictions that left individuals responsible for managing risks that were collectively produced, imperfectly understood, and constantly changing.
The re-reformed NFIP represents a tentative political resolution to the competing individualistic and solidaristic demands made on the program-tentative because it must be reauthorized every five years, when these arrangements can change again. It maintains the actuarial status of the NFIP, insuring natural hazard risk much like a private insurer in order to manage the incentives and responsibilities of individuals. However, it maintains its solidaristic commitment to providing guaranteed coverage and to keeping it within financial reach-no longer through subsidies based on risk, but through some new form of "targeted assistance" based on means. Some flood insurance experts have observed that true actuarialism and affordability in the NFIP, given its embattled history, may be economically and politically incompatible. 73 In high-risk flood zones truly actuarial rates will be unaffordable for too many people, and every move in that direction has been and will be met with opposition, even as some communities face a future in which they will almost certainly be underwater. The case examined here shows that reconciling the two is, at a minimum, politically contentious.
It may make more sense then to extend insurance solidarity, widening the pool of people who must buy into flood insurance to the 500-year floodplain or beyond, or even making it a mandatory part of all homeownership financing. After all, floods have never stopped short at the borders of the official flood zones, beyond which disaster relief continues to compensate uninsured losses. Already, over 20 percent of flood insurance claims come from losses outside of currently mapped high-risk zones (where flood insurance is available but not mandatory). 74 A FEMA-commissioned report on the future effects of climate change on the NFIP found high-risk flood zones increasing an average of 40-45 percent by the year 2100. 75 Rather than engage in political debates about what people in those zones did or ought to choose, we might instead see the coming floods, which we have scientific reason to believe will affect more and more people, as requiring-economically and morally-a broader sharing of the burdens and gains of social interdependence. Economically, extending the risk pool (which would also demand stronger enforcement of the mandatory purchase requirement than has historically existed) protects more people and brings more revenue into the program, helping the program cover the losses of the next flood and keeping it on firmer financial footing. Morally, it treats the coming disasters as a shared challenge, the costs of which we have a duty to share broadly-not because they are an act of God, but because no matter how much we know about the risk, no matter how precisely we can map and price it, collective failures both create flood risk and expose people to it. Some communities are already starting to see things this way, turning the financial pressure on individuals into a mandate to pursue collective flood security, in the form of mitigation projects and buyouts that provide resources for entire communities to retreat from risky waterfronts. 76 The goal, ultimately, is to keep people safe in the face of those hazards, by combining insurance protection with stronger land use regulations and collective investments in rebuilding safer and smarter, higher up or further from the water's edge.
Conclusion
Scientists have concluded that coastal flooding due to global warming has already begun. 77 Yet scholars, policymakers, and publics are only beginning to grasp the challenges climate change poses to welfare states and how individuals and communities might be made more resilient to its worst effects. In some sense, climate change represents the kind of "exogenous shock" described by Esping-Andersen, putting immense new strain on the existing institutional configuration and revealing mismatches between policies and programs and the new and changing social (and natural) risks that citizens face. 78 The experience of natural disasters has serious, long-term consequences for the economic well-being of individuals and communities. How the state distributes responsibility in this policy domain-who gets risk, who gets security, on what terms and at what cost-constitutes an important way in which the state provides for the welfare of its citizens. We ought to include within our analytical view the moral underpinnings of arguments for shifting the costs associated with natural disasters across the balance sheets of families and of the state, particularly as those disasters increase in frequency and severity.
Whether flood insurance, disaster relief, and other forms of natural hazards and disaster policy can organize a social response that adequately protects citizens from an uncertain and changing hazard is an unsettled question. As the NFIP heads into its next reauthorization, much of the policy discussion has focused on potential privatization of the program. Private insurers now believe they have the technical capacity to underwrite flood risk and, with the NFIP moving in the direction of actuarial rating, will be able to compete on price. However, private insurers may skim off the low risks, leaving only the high risks to the state. That will compound the strain. And as other risks, currently privately underwritten, intensify under climate change (e.g., wind, wildfire), increasing insurance premiums may mean that more and more people cannot afford to buy their way into private networks of risk sharing. They too may be left to the state to handle, and a "splintering protectionism" generated in which increasing burdens are unequally felt by different citizens. 
